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Improving the relevance of risk factor 
disclosure in corporate annual reports 
 
Abstract 
This research develops a model for assessing the quality of risk disclosures and applies the 
proposed model to four companies in the food production and processing sector. We 
contribute to the literature by extending prior work on risk disclosure quality using a 
longitudinal approach to assess the quality of risk reporting. While previous studies have 
described disclosure practices, this paper adopts a normative approach to disclosure. By 
suggesting a way of improving risk reporting disclosures, the paper provides guidance for 
current and future company managers. In line with previous research, this paper identifies 
certain problems with existing risk disclosures. Results suggest that company managers 
prefer providing disclosures that are symbolic rather than substantive. We argue that 
institutional factors and proprietary costs contribute towards and can explain this behaviour. 
In suggesting a way forward we highlight the role that stakeholders including managers, 
users, regulators and auditors can play in improving the quality of risk reporting. Flexibility 
in reporting could be maintained by adopting a properly monitored ‘comply or explain’ 
approach.   
Keywords:   
Voluntary disclosure 
Risk reporting 
Corporate guidance 
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1. Introduction, objectives and contribution 
A number of studies have examined risk reporting, yet the topic is still very much in its 
infancy. Although risk reporting is potentially of interest to a wide range of user groups, 
recent research has indicated that current risk reporting is unhelpful and does not convey real 
meaning (Campbell & Slack, 2008; Moxey & Berendt, 2008; Davies, Moxey, & Welch, 
2010).  
 
There is now an increasing focus on forward-looking information in corporate annual 
reports, for example, from regulation (Companies Act 2006), best practice statements such 
as the International Accounting Standards Board Management Commentary (IASB, 2010) 
and the Accounting Standards Board’s (ASB) reporting statement on the operating and 
financial review (ASB, 2006), together with pressure from various stakeholder groups 
wishing to improve transparency in the post credit crisis era (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales - ICAEW, 2011). Evidence suggests an increase in the 
amount of narrative information provided by companies over time (ASB, 2007 & 2009; 
Campbell & Slack, 2008). However, despite this increase, there appears to be limited interest 
among professional users of this information due to concerns about the quality/usefulness of 
this form of disclosure (Campbell & Slack, 2008). Where disclosure is non–specific, 
boilerplate, or merely describes a risk management policy (Linsley & Shrives, 2006), its use 
is limited.
1
 
 
Traditionally, studies often look at the quantity of information disclosed by companies, yet 
over the years research has served to remind readers that the quality of information is more 
important than the quantity (for example, Marston & Shrives, 1991; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Hasseldine, Salama, & Toms, 2005; Beck, Campbell, & Shrives, 2010; Hooks & van 
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Staden, 2011).  Within the risk reporting literature the majority of studies examine the 
quantity of disclosure, typically measured using words/sentences or some form of disclosure 
checklist. One strand of research within this literature examines the particular type of risk 
disclosure or the quality of disclosure, (for example descriptive or quantitative risk 
disclosure) and these include Woods and Marginson (2004); Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 
2008); Dobler, Lajili and Zéghal (2011); Lajili and Zéghal (2005); Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) and the Accounting Standards Board (2007 & 2009). These studies highlight 
concerns relating to brief, very general and not sufficiently forward-looking risk disclosure 
practices. All these studies have one thing in common, namely they indicate a lack of 
progress in risk reporting. 
 
The overall objective of this paper is to discuss how best to improve reporting of principal 
risk factors by public listed companies. The outcome of this research suggests three 
questions that preparers need to address in their disclosures. This study employs a 
longitudinal approach to assess the quality of risk reporting using four companies within the 
food production and processing industry. This industry has been chosen because readers are 
likely to be familiar with its activities and also because of a number risk related issues in this 
sector. These include food safety concerns (Knowles, Moody, & McEachern, 2007), 
regulatory investigations over anti–competitive practices (Office of Fair Trading, 2011), 
change in raw material prices, changes in legislation, brand reputation damage and shifts in 
consumer preferences (Financial Times, 2005, 2007). Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley (2004) 
also focus on this sector as part of their detailed study on narrative disclosures.  
 
This study contributes to this literature by extending prior work on risk disclosure quality 
using a longitudinal approach to assess the quality of risk reporting.  While previous studies 
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have described disclosure practices, this paper adopts a normative approach to disclosure. 
This study extends and develops the research on risk reporting quality in three ways.  First, 
two complementary theoretical frameworks are utilised to explain the current (problematic) 
state of risk reporting. Second, risk issues are often dynamic, yet previous studies which 
focus on only one year of reporting, fail to encapsulate movements in risk reporting. Third, 
our study provides a model (depicted pictorially) based around three questions which 
managers and others can use for both preparing and assessing the quality of annual report 
risk reporting. We provide a fresh perspective to assessing the quality of risk disclosure by 
moving away from the counting of words and sentences. 
  
This paper proceeds as follows. Theoretical perspectives are discussed and linked to themes; 
data and method used are then described followed by a discussion of the results. Proposals 
for improving the quality of risk reporting are provided. Theoretical perspectives are 
discussed in the light of the results, followed by policy implications and suggestions for 
further research. 
 
2. Analysing theoretical perspectives on risk reporting  
A comprehensive theory of discretionary disclosure which clearly identifies the determinants 
of disclosure does not yet exist.
2
 The selection of the theory appears to depend on the area of 
discretionary disclosure selected for study and even then practice is inconsistent and 
“unifying ... empirical findings within a theoretical framework remains a challenge” 
(Cormier, Magnan, & van Velthoven, 2005, p. 6). A multi–theoretic approach is often 
thought to be appropriate where no one dominant theory is operating. This is very much the 
case throughout the disclosure literature. For instance, Cormier et al. (2005) suggest using 
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“wider conceptual lenses” (p. 8) to make sense of different findings in environmental 
disclosure research and this observation is equally applicable to risk reporting. Although 
agency theory is often applied in voluntary disclosure studies, it is sometimes criticised for 
its limitations (Band, 1992). For instance, Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very (2007) believe it 
fails to capture real world views and this “engenders an under-socialized view of agents and 
principals, thereby reducing the model’s relevance” (p. 43). Notwithstanding that other 
theories are occasionally useful, this study privileges institutional theory alongside 
proprietary costs theory.  These two theories are selected for several reasons. First, they 
provide a way of explaining and understanding the current problematic state of risk 
reporting. Second, the theories work particularly well both in concert and individually where 
they can also capture different aspects of risk reporting. Third, the theories can help 
understand the processes at work which result in limited and general disclosures which bear 
little or no relation to the risk identification and management processes within organizations. 
Finally, the mimetic aspect of institutional theory may also be helpful in envisioning a 
solution to current limitations of risk reporting. Using these selected complementary and 
intersecting theories provides greater insight than utilising just a single economic theory, 
such as agency theory, because “they explicitly recognize that organizations evolve within a 
society that encompasses many political, social and institutional frameworks” (see Cormier 
et al., 2005, p. 7 and related discussion). 
2.1 Proprietary costs theory 
Proprietary costs theory can explain why current risk disclosure practice may be unhelpful to 
users of financial information. This theory embodies the costs and benefits of disclosure. 
Company managers may be unsure of which standpoint to adopt in relation to risk 
disclosure. In particular, while most companies are likely to have detailed risk management 
systems, they may be reluctant to disclose information which they feel is commercially or 
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politically sensitive (Marshall & Weetman, 2007). This is because “outside parties (may) use 
the information in ways that are harmful to its interests (e.g., competitors, pressure groups)” 
(Cormier et al., 2005, pp. 8–9). Thus, there may be a mismatch between items which appear 
in internal documents such as company risk registers and information that company 
managers are willing to disclose externally. Therefore managers have a dilemma; how much 
and what sort of information to disclose? If they are too secretive their risk management 
systems may be perceived as weak or non–existent and investors may feel frustrated that the 
company’s disclosures are limited. If the risk disclosures are too transparent and reflect the 
risk registers and other management tools used in the control of risks (sometimes referred to 
as an ‘inside out’ approach – ICAEW, 2004), then managers may feel that they will incur 
proprietary costs. Thus, “... in choosing a disclosure strategy, managers have to trade off the 
benefits from expanded disclosure against the costs of disclosing potentially damaging 
information. Prior evidence in financial reporting does suggest that information costs are a 
critical determinant of corporate financial disclosure decisions” (Cormier et al., 2005, p. 9).  
 
Proprietary costs theory, as developed by Verrecchia (1983), suggests that the decision to 
disclose information is a function of the consequential costs.  Costs are incurred by the 
company when any reduction in future cash flow results from a particular disclosure and can 
arise in a number of different ways. A typical view is that disclosure of ‘bad news’ results in 
a cost because investors and potential investors are discouraged. However, if the disclosure 
of ‘bad news’ prevents potential competitors entering the market or a particular subsection of 
the market, future cash flows may increase as a result. The opposite is true for the disclosure 
of favourable news. Although favourable news is likely to result in positive future cash flows 
by making the company more attractive to outside investors, it may also serve to encourage 
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competitors and potential competitors to enter the market, thereby reducing those future cash 
flows.  
 
Clearly managers may try to manipulate their disclosures (for example restrict or provide 
boilerplate) to minimise any proprietary costs. Skinner (1994) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 
(1999) suggest that companies (or their managers) need to incur some ‘upfront’ proprietary 
costs in order to enhance their reputation as a ‘quality (or credible) discloser’ (see also 
discussion in Cormier et al., 2005).  
 
2.2 Institutional theory 
Disclosure may not be purely an economic decision, particularly when social and political 
aspects also need to be considered. Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 
1991) can clarify our thinking about disclosure in a number of different ways. First, because 
of the cost/benefit uncertainties of disclosure, understandably, managers may consider 
mimicking other companies’ disclosures (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004), particularly 
companies with good reputations. By mimicking information in their disclosures, companies 
can signal that their risk management systems are equivalent to the industry standard. 
Although some risks will apply industry-wide, the ways in which they affect individual 
companies may differ depending on the firm characteristics (range of business activities, 
location of activities, factors concerning customers and suppliers and plans in place to 
address business risks and so on). Other risks may be specific to a company. Ideally, these 
characteristics should be reflected in disclosures. If companies only provide disclosures 
similar to other companies’, they are likely to be general and non–specific. These general 
disclosures (referred to by Day & Woodward, 2004, as symbolic rather than substantive) will 
be of limited use to readers and, unlike analysts, they may find it difficult to obtain more 
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information about the companies in order to assess the risks faced, appreciate the risk profile 
and evaluate the risk appetite. In the longer term, disclosures will be ignored as they are seen 
as unhelpful.   
 
Second, “institutional pressures can drive organizations to engage in routine social actions” 
(Cormier et al., 2005, p. 13). This suggests that once managers have decided on their risk 
disclosures, however they are derived, they become reluctant to make changes to existing 
disclosures, particularly where the consequences of those extra or altered disclosures are 
unclear.  As such, organizations use standardised disclosures which involve little incremental 
disclosure costs, either from an internal cost perspective or from a propriety costs viewpoint. 
Managers of companies may take the view that if the disclosures are ‘tried and tested’ they 
should be retained, as any variations are likely to attract unwelcome attention. Although in 
the short term the disclosures may appear acceptable and appear to ‘tick a box’, the contents 
of that box are unlikely to be sustainable. Risks are fluid and likely to change, either in their 
existence or intensity.  
 
Writing of either generalised risk disclosures or repeating risk disclosures from previous 
years may be akin to cargo cult science. Spence, Husillos, & Correa–Ruiz (2010) in the 
context of environmental accounting refer to the work of the anthropologist Kirk Huffman 
who used the term ‘cargo cult’ while studying the behaviour of islanders on Vanuatu 
(Raffaele, 2006). Cargo cults refers (for example) to the apparent practice of South Sea 
Islanders trying (in vain) to attract aircraft supposedly loaded with cargo (westernised goods) 
by constructing false landing strips complete with bamboo antennae and coconut radios. The 
antennae and radios do not function, despite having the appearance of doing so. 
Consequently no aircraft land and no cargo is ever received. Similarly, risk disclosures 
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which are general or routine may have the appearance of valid disclosures but in actuality no 
information content is provided and readers do not find them useful. Their construction is 
undeniable but they are effectively content-free. The aircraft do not land and the risk 
disclosures do not inform. In fact, this sort of risk disclosure may actually detract from other 
useful information (ICAEW, 2011).  
           
This leads on to a third aspect of institutional theory. In cargo cult science, the runways and 
control towers are not functional and effectively do not exist. In risk reporting, while the 
disclosures seem non-specific, this is not necessarily because the organization has failed to 
identify specific risks. In other words, the company is likely to have proper systems to 
identify risks but these may be decoupled from the disclosures.  
 
Institutional theory is congruent with proprietary costs theory in three different ways. First, it 
predicts disclosures will be symbolic rather than substantive in nature. Second, as discussed 
above, there is also a danger that those general disclosures may be decoupled from the actual 
risk management practices (Irvine, 2008). Third, disclosure will become routine and not 
change much over time. Even where detailed disclosures are provided, they may merely be 
an exercise in reputation risk management. All these factors may increase costs for investors 
(Rubinstein, 2001). 
3. A model to assess the quality of risk reporting 
These theories help to explain why earlier research has found that risk disclosure is of poor 
quality and lacking in relevance. From these theories it is possible to derive themes which 
are relevant to an assessment of the quality of risk disclosures and can also help to identify 
the characteristics of good risk disclosure. Although the theories can relate to a number of 
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themes, this section of the paper identifies the particular theory which is most useful in 
deriving the specific theme. In addition to the two theories identified, we also draw on 
relevant literature, legislation and best practice guidelines that relate to risk disclosure to 
develop our model.  
 
Proprietary costs theory suggests that companies have a tendency to report general 
disclosures similar in content to those of other companies. Those generic disclosures could 
apply to any company and would also tend to be routine in nature. That sort of disclosure is 
unlikely to be useful to readers but research suggests that it is the type of disclosure which 
occurs in practice. In contrast, this research suggests that disclosures should be specific to 
the company concerned and should be regularly revisited to make sure they are still relevant.  
This leads us to the first theme: 
3.1 Theme 1: Disclosure information should be both specific to the company and regularly 
updated  
The Companies Act (2006), the Reporting Statement on the Operating and Financial Review 
(ASB, 2006; 2003; 1993) and the IASB Management Commentary (IASB, 2010) require or 
recommend that companies report information on risk factors that are considered significant 
to the business. Section 417 of the Companies Act 2006 requires a Business Review within 
the directors’ report. This includes the requirement for ‘a description of the principal risks 
and uncertainties facing the company’ (S 417 (3) (b)). The ICAEW’s various reports on risk 
reporting (see for example 1999 and 2011) also highlight the importance of prioritising 
principal risks within annual reports and highlighting current concerns. This emphasis on 
reporting only the significant risk factors is further commented on by the ASB stating, 
“companies looking to improve should take care to avoid too many risks to all be ‘principal’ 
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(as well as) generic risks that could easily be cut and pasted into any report” (ASB, 2009, p. 
6).  
 
Schrand and Elliot (1998) quote from US Statement of Position 94–6, Disclosure of Certain 
Significant Risks and Uncertainties that the central feature of risk “disclosure requirements is 
selectivity: specified criteria to screen the hosts of risks and uncertainties that affect every 
entity so that required disclosures are limited to matters significant to a particular entity” 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 1994, p. 1). In discussing 
significant risk factors, the US guidelines also emphasise disclosure that is not generic in 
nature. Item 503 (c) of regulation S–K specifies that risk factor disclosure should clearly 
state the risk and specify how the particular risk affects the particular registrant, noting that  
“registrants should not present risks that could apply to any registrant” (Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), 2010,  Section 6294). Schrand and Elliot (1998) criticise the disclosure 
of very general risk factors by companies and note, “disclosures of certain risks in particular 
industry–wide risks are so boilerplate that they actually reduce the informativeness of the set 
of risk disclosures by obfuscating important risks” (p. 280). Further, based on evidence 
collected from institutional investors, Solomon, Solomon, Norton, and Joseph (2000) 
highlight the importance of disclosing detailed company-specific information rather than 
general statements on risk factors. Specific information is much more likely to change from 
year to year rather than general information which might apply to any one year or indeed to 
all years. This suggests that company managers need to revisit risk disclosure regularly 
deciding which disclosures are still relevant and which need to be replaced with new 
information. Proprietary costs theory suggests that managers prefer the safety of general 
routine disclosures which do not change from year to year and hence do not need to be 
evaluated.  While this behaviour is understandable, such disclosures will be of limited use 
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and so this theory enables us to identify the second theme in providing quality risk 
disclosures: 
3.2 Theme 2: Company managers should evaluate risk disclosures on a regular basis within 
annual reports 
The SEC comment letters on risk reporting within the narratives emphasise the importance 
of evaluating risk disclosures on a regular basis (SEC, 2010). Disclosure of this evaluation 
provides investors with important information on the changing nature of risk factors. The 
ASB notes in its review of narrative reporting, “A best practice report should also provide 
some context for the risk – is it increasing or decreasing and some idea of the impact of a 
risk crystallising” (ASB, 2009, p. 6), a view echoed in a recent publication on risk reporting 
by the ICAEW (2011). Recommendations from a survey of investors on governance 
reporting by Independent Audit (2006) also note, “companies should focus on current, 
relevant issues to avoid year–on–year repetition of these disclosures” (p. 4). They comment 
that, “annual repetition with little change in the text can leave users with a feeling that not 
much effort has gone into the report” (p. 4). The importance of a regular review of risk 
information has also been highlighted by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in its 
review of the Turnbull internal control guidelines (Solomon, 2010). If the position of a 
company over the year regarding its risk factor(s) remains stable, as evaluated by its top 
management, then this should be explicitly stated with clear reasons. This provides investors 
with assurance that management has evaluated the risk factor(s) disclosures even though 
they appear to be unchanged.  
 
Together, Themes 1 and 2 lead to Research Question 1:   
(1) Is risk information specific to the company and are there changes to reported risks in risk 
factor statements over time?  
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Specifically we examine:  
i. whether managers have disclosed information that is general in nature or specific to 
the company; 
ii. whether the same information is disclosed over the time period examined (i.e., to 
what extent information remains unaltered in annual reports from one year to the 
next); 
iii. whether managers have disclosed how a particular risk factor is relevant to both the 
financial year under review and the company’s future strategy; and 
iv. whether, in the risk factor list, an explanation is provided as to why risk factors have 
been added to or removed. 
Institutional theory helps identify our third theme. A key aspect of institutional theory 
indicates that decoupling may occur, which in this context means that real risks are not 
reflected in company disclosures. Thus, because disclosures do not reflect reality, managers 
may not feel the need to revisit them in the light of risk events which have taken place. In 
contrast, a normative approach would suggest that risk disclosures should be amended over 
time because risks are likely to require regular revisiting and reassessment. Risk experiences 
need to be discussed in annual reports in the light of previous disclosures to confirm their 
coherence and authenticity. Disclosures which do not change or do not appear to be 
discussed in annual reports are likely to be decoupled from the company’s actual risk 
management processes and experiences. This accords with the third theme discussed in this 
research:  
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3.3 Theme 3: Disclosures within annual reports should incorporate the discussion of actual 
risk experiences 
Woods and Marginson (2004) note within the context of risk disclosure that, “relevance 
requires information to have predictive or confirmatory value, and to be reliable it must also 
be a faithful representation of reality” (p. 376). Therefore, if forward-looking information is 
accurate, some of the risks should crystallise. Solomon (2010) also comments on the 
importance of predictive discussions within the context of internal control risk reporting. 
Another issue relates to companies focusing on risk events that have occurred over the 
financial year and incorporating them into their risk factor statement review. Schrand and 
Elliot (1998) highlight two advantages of reporting historic risk information. They note that 
such disclosures provide information on the nature of a company’s risk management system 
and “can implicitly provide information about the joint nature of risks within a firm” (p. 
281). The most recent ICAEW report on risk reporting (2011) also highlights the importance 
of firms reporting on their risk experience. It argues, “firms can report on their risk 
experiences over the past year, discuss how far it matches their previous risk reporting, and 
explain what lessons they have learnt” (p. 44).  
 
Theme 3 leads to Research Questions 2 and 3:  
(2) Are significant events identified in prior risk factor statements? 
This question is answered in two stages. First, we identify significant events that affect the 
performance of the company. Information that leads to extreme share price changes is 
defined here as a significant event. Our focus on extreme price movements ensures that we 
collect value-relevant information which is of interest to investors and other capital market 
participants (Ryan & Taffler, 2004).  Second, we examine the risk factor statements of 
companies in the years prior to the event to find out whether the companies have identified 
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the events in the risk factors in their earlier reporting. If risk factor statements are to serve 
their purpose of informing investors of the principal risk factors then it would be expected 
that the statements would provide some ex ante indication of the event. 
 
(3) Are significant observed events discussed in subsequent risk factor statements? 
We examine the risk factor statements to find out if companies have discussed the event and 
made changes to their risk disclosure after the event. If companies are engaging with the risk 
factor statements we would expect to see significant real incidents reflected in these 
statements. Where events occur it is reasonable to argue that they, in turn, will have some 
bearing on future risks and therefore should be discussed in subsequent annual reports.
3
 
 
The links between theory and themes (and subsequent research questions) are also 
summarised in Table 1. Table 1 demonstrates how the components of each theory lead to the 
themes but also indicates how the two theories act in concert to explain current practice. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Our model is depicted in Figure 1 together with the specific research questions used to assess 
the relevance of risk factor disclosures: 
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
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4. Data and method 
4.1 Sample 
The risk factor disclosure in this study is based on annual reports of companies that belong 
to the Food Producers and Processors sector (NMX3570) and were part of the FTSE 100 as 
listed on Northcote
4
 in July 2008. There were four companies that met these criteria: 
Cadbury PLC
5
, Tate and Lyle PLC, Associated British Foods (ABF) PLC and the Unilever 
Group. In order to assess how risk disclosures changed over time, annual reports for the 
financial years 2002 to 2007 were collected. 
 
4.2 Content analysis 
Content analysis (Bowman, 1984; Krippendorff, 2004) was used to identify the risk factors 
within annual reports. Smith and Taffler (2000) highlight two alternative forms of content 
analysis; form oriented (objective) and meaning oriented (subjective) analysis. While a 
meaning oriented analysis involves a higher level of subjectivity it enables a richer analysis 
of the data (Smith & Taffler, 2000).  Factors that can affect the future cash flows of the 
company and are explicitly highlighted as risk information in the narrative section of annual 
reports are considered as risk factors.  
 
In examining whether risk factor information is specific to the company, we use a concept 
from the work of Day and Woodward (2004). They categorise employee disclosures into 
substantive and symbolic groups. In analysing the risk disclosures, we similarly divide the 
information into two broad groups:  
(1) Factors that are general in nature which apply to any business or any business within 
the industry (symbolic)  
18 
 
(2) Factors that are company specific (substantive) 
 
Issues exist with disclosing information that is common to any business or general industry 
related information, where there is no discussion of how the factor(s) will affect the 
particular company. Table 2 includes illustrative examples of general and specific 
information from annual reports. 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
In order to evaluate changes over time to the risk factor disclosures, we examined risk 
factors that are common to each company over the time period. Our evaluation focused on 
changes to the substance of the discussion. We also use the Ferret copy detector software 
(Lane, 2013) to examine for similarities in the wording of the risk factor disclosure over time 
within the common risk factors.
6
 The software is used to locate duplicate text in more than 
one document. It computes a similarity measure (from zero to one) based on trigrams (a 
group of three letters representing one sound) found within the documents under comparison 
(Lane, 2013; Nelson & Pritchard, 2007).  
4.3 Determination of significant events (Research Questions 2 and 3) 
In order to identify significant events, we focus on news events associated with economically 
significant price changes over a five year period for the companies in our sample. Daily 
market adjusted share price returns for the time period 2003 to 2007 were calculated with the 
FTSE All–Share index as a proxy for the market portfolio. Share price data was obtained 
from Thomson DataStream. The mean and standard deviations were also calculated monthly 
for each stock to account for variations in volatility over time. We classify an adjusted return 
as important if it is outside one standard deviation from the mean.
7
 Over the period 2003 to 
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2007, the dates on which the five most important positive and negative share price changes 
occurred were considered as significant. We then searched the Financial Times’ database to 
identify company-specific news announcements over a five-day event window, two days 
prior to the event date and three days after the event date
8
, following the approach used by 
Ryan and Taffler (2004). If the news clearly related to the share price change this was noted 
against the event.
9
 News items gave both general reasons (such as an earnings 
announcement) as well as specific reasons (such as a particular product line not performing 
as expected) for the price movement. By associating a news event with the share price 
change, we reduce the probability, of other factors (noise) being responsible for the change 
in price. Our approach followed the methods of Statistical Process Control or SPC used to 
identify variations in a series of data (Montgomery, 2004). SPC is used in a number of 
settings related to quality control and process improvement where there is a need to identify 
unusual variations as is the case in our study.
10
  Ryan and Taffler (2004) show that corporate 
news events drive a major portion of firms' economically significant price changes. Focusing 
on significant price movements enabled us to avoid the potential for picking up substantial 
amounts of random market activity and therefore concentrate on events that are of most 
importance to investors and other capital market participants (Ryan & Taffler, 2004; 
Beneish, Lee & Tarpley, 2001).  
 
Price movements reflect changes in the market consensus opinion as a result of news 
releases (Beaver, 1968).  Share price changes associated with a news announcement can be, 
"a function of both the changes in expected cash flows as well as the risk or volatility of 
future cash flows" (Henricks & Singhal, 2005, p. 36). Our tests do not separate the effect of 
changes in expected cash flows from the volatility of future cash flows but at the same time 
there is evidence that major news events associated with significant price changes have an 
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impact on the equity risk of a firm (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005; Healy & Palepu, 1990; 
Fargher & Wilkins, 1998). It is also important to point out that if the markets are considered 
efficient, price changes will only occur as a reaction to news that was not anticipated by 
market participants. 
 
Following the approach taken in Bhamornsiri and Schroeder (2004), we also conducted a 
key word search of the entire annual report. The key word search is based on the significant 
events that have affected the performance of the company. For example, the disappointing 
performance of Tate and Lyle’s premier product SPLENDA® Sucralose was associated with 
a share price decline of 27.5% in January 2007. In addition to examining explicit risk 
sections we searched for ‘SPLENDA® Sucralose’ in all prior annual reports. We used the 
same approach to identify risk disclosure after the significant events. 
 
 
The news announcements are classified based on risk categories published by the ICAEW 
(ICAEW, 2002, Appendix I and II, pp. 55–58) that were developed by an accountancy firm. 
Since we focus on the top and bottom five significant price changes, we have 20 negative 
and 20 positive price changes for the four companies. We were able to specifically identify 
14 news events associated with negative price changes and 11 associated with positive price 
changes. Thus, 62.5% of the price changes can be linked to publicly available information 
(70% negative and 55% positive). We note that there is a difference in the source of 
information in relation to the type of news events (see Table 3.1). A detailed breakdown of 
the events is provided in Table 3.2.   
 
<Insert Table 3.1 here> 
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<Insert Table 3.2 here> 
5. Results 
We begin the discussion of the results by providing an overview of the risk factor 
statements; this is followed by a discussion of the specific questions. By way of illustration 
we provide examples of risk disclosure from annual reports in line with the approach used by 
Day and Woodward (2004). 
 
5.1 Overview of Risk factor statements 
Each of the four companies had a clearly identified risk factor section in the annual report 
narrative with headings such as ‘Risk Factors’, ‘Risk Management Review’ and ‘Risk 
Management’. However, Tate and Lyle (TATE) and Associated British Foods (ABF) did not 
have an explicit risk factor statement prior to the reporting year 2005 and 2006. Table 4 
provides information on the number of principal risk factors disclosed by the companies over 
the time period examined. Cadbury is the only company that added significantly to the 
number of risk factors over time (from 11 in 2004 to 17 in 2007) while Tate and Lyle 
decreased the number of risk factors reported (from 19 in 2005 to 13 in 2007). 
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
5.2 Discussion of Question 1: Are there changes in reported risks in risk factor statements 
over time? 
Information within each of the risk factors was examined to ascertain whether the content 
was general in nature or specific to the company. The figures within Table 4 provide 
information on the number and type of risk factors disclosed. They show numbers of general 
risk factors with those figures in brackets representing specific risk factors. In the majority of 
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cases, risk factor information appears symbolic reflecting general factors that can affect any 
type of large-scale business or common industry related factors. In general the information is 
qualitative in nature, with little evidence of managers trying to quantify the impact of each 
risk factor. There are nine factors that are common to at least three companies: product 
quality, legal and regulatory factors, business partners, recruiting and retaining employees, 
geographic spread and economic instability, raw material and commodity costs, competition, 
reputation and pension liabilities. Other than raw material and commodity costs the other 
factors do not appear to be industry-specific but rather general factors that can impact any 
type of large-scale business.  
 
<Insert Table 5.1 here> 
 
Table 5.1 indicates the percentage of risk factors where similar information is reported over 
the time period examined. This is calculated by dividing the number of risk factors where 
there was no change to the substance of the discussion by the total number of common risk 
factors for each company. It is apparent that in the majority of cases the discussion remains 
the same with no substantial changes to reflect the changing nature of risk factors. Two 
examples highlight this and are shown in the tables below (Question 1: Examples 1 and 2).  
 
Question 1: Example 1 
Non–compliance with legislation can lead to financial and reputational damage. 
The Group is aware of the importance of complying with all applicable 
legislation affecting its business activities and of the potential damage to 
reputation and financial impact which can result from any breach. 
Source: Tate and Lyle Annual Reports 2005 (p. 26), 2006 (p. 24), 2007 (p. 30) 
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Question 1: Example 2 
Other Risks: Unilever’s businesses are exposed to varying degrees of risk and 
uncertainty related to other factors including: 
Competitive pricing, consumption levels, physical risks, legislative, fiscal tax 
and regulatory developments, terrorism and economic, political and social 
conditions in the environments where we operate. All of these risks could 
materially affect the Group’s business, our turnover, operating profit, net profit, 
net assets and liquidity. There may be risks which are unknown to Unilever or 
which are currently believed to be immaterial. 
Source: Unilever Annual Reports 2005 (p. 32), 2006 (p. 10), 2007 (p. 14) 
 
However, there are a few cases of companies reflecting on the changing nature of risk factors 
and Question 1: Example 3 illustrates this.  
 
Question 1: Example 3 
Price and supply of raw materials and commodities contracts 
Where appropriate, we purchase forward contracts for raw materials and commodities, 
almost always for physical delivery. We may also use futures contracts to hedge future price 
movements; however, the amounts are not material. With the adoption of IFRSs from 1 
January 2005, we are required to recognise financial derivatives (which include forward 
contracts) at their fair value on the balance sheet. 
 
Price and supply of raw materials and commodities contracts 
Prices of raw materials and commodities increased significantly throughout 2006, adversely 
impacting margin where we were unable to pass on increased costs. To mitigate such risks, 
and where appropriate, we purchase forward contracts for raw materials and commodities, 
almost always for physical delivery. Where appropriate we also use futures contracts to 
hedge future price movements; however, the amounts are not material. 
 
Price and supply of raw materials and commodities contracts 
We faced significant increases in the cost of various commodities and raw and packing 
materials throughout the year. We have been able to substantially mitigate these through a 
combination of price increases, supply chain savings and mix improvements. We see a trend 
of increasing commodity prices going into 2008. In addition to our on-going actions to 
mitigate these risks, and where appropriate, we purchase forward contracts for raw 
materials and commodities. Where appropriate, we also use futures contracts to hedge future 
price movements, however, the amounts are not material. 
 
Source: Unilever Annual Report, 2005 (p. 32), 2006 (p. 10), 2007 (p. 14)  
 
 
<Insert Table 5.2 here> 
 
24 
 
As a second step, we also use the Ferret copy detector software (described above) to examine 
for similarities in the wordings of the risk factors over time within the common risk factors. 
Lane (2013, p.4) notes that, "similarity scores above 0.04 are likely to reveal significant 
copying". Table 5.2 shows that the average similarity score ranges from 0.23 to 0.78. We 
note that the Ferret similarity scores understate the similarities when companies have made 
minor changes to their reporting practices. In Example 4 below, the software produced a 
similarity score of 0.6 for the following risk factor disclosures when the substance of the 
discussion remains essentially the same. 
 
Question 1: Example 4 
Competition and demand 
Both the beverages and confectionery industries are highly competitive. In our major 
markets, we compete with other multinational corporations which have significant 
financial resources to respond to and develop the markets in which both we and they 
operate. These resources may be applied to change areas of focus or to increase 
investments in marketing or new products. This could cause our sales or margins to 
decrease in these markets. Furthermore, consumer tastes are susceptible to change. If 
we are unable to respond successfully to rapid changes in consumer preferences, our 
sales or margins in individual markets could be materially adversely affected. 
 
Competition and demand 
Both the beverage and confectionery industries are highly competitive. We compete 
with other multinational corporations which have significant financial resources to 
respond to and develop the markets in which both we and they operate. These 
resources may be applied to change areas of focus or to increase investments in 
marketing or new products. Furthermore, consumer tastes are susceptible to change. If 
we are unable to respond successfully to rapid changes in demand or consumer 
preferences, our sales or margins could be adversely affected. 
 
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2005 (p. 24) and  2006 (p. 38)  
 
These examples illustrate very general or non–specific disclosures which could apply to any 
company in this or a similar industry. The fact that they remain unchanged over time 
indicates disclosure inertia and as a consequence the information is unlikely to be 
particularly useful to any of the identified constituents. We do not find evidence in any case 
of companies reflecting on risk factors in relation to information provided in prior risk factor 
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statements. Moreover, in cases where a risk factor is dropped or added to the list no 
explanation has been provided for the change in any of the risk factor statements examined. 
5.3 Discussion of Question 2: Are significant events identified in prior risk factor 
statements? 
We do not find evidence of significant events being reported by companies as risk factors for 
positive or negative events prior to the significant price change in any of the companies 
within our sample. As discussed earlier, while companies have provided very general 
discussions of risk factor statements, there is no evidence of specific information that relates 
to the significant events that affected the performance of the company. We use two examples 
to illustrate this.   
 
Unilever saw a significant fall in share price after the release of its quarterly earnings 
announcement in 2003. The share price fell by 10% on the 2
nd
 of May 2003. One of the 
reasons for this was that Unilever’s key product SlimFast® had not performed as expected 
and had experienced falling sales. Unilever’s 2002 risk factor statement discusses branded 
products in Question 2:  Example 1a. 
 
Question 2: Example 1a 
Our brands:  
A key element of our Path to Growth strategy is the development of a small 
number of global, leading brands. Any adverse event affecting consumer 
confidence or continuity of supply of such a brand would have an effect on the 
overall business. 
Source: Unilever Annual Report 2002, p. 40 
 
While the company has identified brands as a risk factor on a general level, the company has 
not provided any specific information on the key brands within this statement. In other 
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sections of the report the company discusses SlimFast
®
 in a positive light and how it has 
contributed to growth within the company (see Question 2:  Example 1b).  
 Question 2: Example 1b 
In 2002, we continued to meet the growing consumer demand for healthy food 
products, in both industrialized and developing markets. New additions to the 
SlimFast
®
 range helped consumers to manage their weight healthily with food 
that fits into their daily lives. SlimFast
®
 sales grew 10.8%, with a range 
extending from meal replacement drinks and bars to soups. It continued to 
expand beyond its US heartland, in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. 
SlimFast
®
 continues to focus on the health and wellness consumer hotspot and is 
well positioned in relation to emerging concerns about obesity. 
Source: Unilever Annual Report 2002, p. 27 
 
In the case of Tate and Lyle, two significant events were associated with the company in 
2007, both resulting from profit warnings. On the 23
rd
 of January 2007 its market-adjusted 
share price fell by 15.7% and by 27.5% on the 28
th
 of September 2007.  A number of reasons 
accounted for this including the underperformance of one its key products, SPLENDA
®
 
Sucralose. Within the 2006 risk factor statements the company provides a general discussion 
of factors that could affect demand for their products (see Question 2:  Example 2). 
 
Question 2: Example 2 
Changes in consumer dietary requirements and preferences or new scientific 
evidence could decrease demand for our products. 
 
A decline in consumption of one or more product categories could occur in the 
future due to a variety of factors (such as concerns about obesity and diabetes 
resulting in a consumer preference for lighter, lower calorie beverages and foods) 
or could occur in the future if new scientific research or studies were to raise 
material issues regarding the adverse safety or health effects of food products 
which are currently considered safe and healthy. Although our product offering 
contains alternative products to meet these preferences and concerns we may not 
be able to adapt our production and research and development as rapidly as 
market changes occur in the mix of products used. If there were found to be any 
long–term detrimental effects to any of Tate and Lyle’s products this could 
impact the Group’s future profitability. 
Source: Tate and Lyle Annual Report 2006, p. 24 
 
27 
 
SPLENDA
®
 Sucralose is mentioned 45 times in the 2006 annual report. The Chairman’s 
statement and the CEO’s review discuss the positive impact SPLENDA® Sucralose has had 
on the company and how the product forms part of the key strategy for growth, with the 
financial review stating that “demand for SPLENDA® Sucralose is expected to remain 
strong during calendar year 2006” (Source:  Tate and Lyle Annual Report 2006, p. 29). 
5.4  Discussion of Question 3:  Are the significant observed events discussed in subsequent 
risk factor statements? 
We do not find any evidence of changes in the risk factor statement to reflect real incidents 
that have affected the value of the company. As discussed earlier, information under each 
risk factor seldom changes between reports and this is the case even after significant events 
have affected their performance. However, we did find evidence of significant events being 
discussed elsewhere in the annual report after the events. The following examples have been 
provided in relation to the significant events identified above. Example 1 is connected to 
Examples 1a and 1b in Question 2. In its 2004 annual report Unilever discusses SlimFast
®
 
23 times and refers clearly to the fall in demand: 
 
Question 3: Example 1 
SlimFast
®
 has been heavily affected by changing consumer tastes and dieting 
choices. We have responded with the launch of a range of new products in the 
second half of the year, and a relaunch of the brand at the start of 2004. We 
remain confident of the longer–term growth opportunity, based on our leadership 
of this large growth market and the proven approach of SlimFast
®
 to healthy 
weight management underpinned by clinical studies and continued strong 
endorsement from the medical profession.  
 
Turnover of SlimFast
®
 declined by 21% as the entire weight–loss category was 
hit by an unprecedented shift in consumer preferences towards low–carbohydrate 
products. The impact was especially pronounced in the US, the largest market 
for SlimFast
®
. SlimFast
®
 has responded by focusing on the SlimFast
®
 Plan as a 
proven and effective weight–loss programme with an expanded range of 
products, including pasta and soups. Low–carbohydrate and high–protein 
products were also launched at the end of 2003. 
Source: Unilever Annual Report 2004, pp.  26 and 39 
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In its 2007 annual report Tate and Lyle describes the performance of SPLENDA
®
 Sucralose 
in a number of sections. The following example (Question 3: Example 2) refers to the 
Chairman’s Report and is connected to Question 2:  Example 2 in the previous section.   
 
Question 3: Example 2 
As stated in our announcement on 23
rd
 of January 2007, the SPLENDA
®
 
Sucralose business achieved only modest growth in the year, a disappointment in 
what was otherwise a successful year for the Group. A number of factors caused 
the slower than anticipated acceleration of uptake from our major customers:  
Product development life–cycles returning to more normal levels following the 
Atkins diet period; the depletion of customers’ security stocks of SPLENDA® 
Sucralose in response to our new capacity coming on stream; and volumes to the 
US carbonated soft drink sector not meeting our expectations. 
Source: Tate and Lyle Annual Report 2007, p. 6. 
 
 
While it would be unlikely that risk factors always coincide with events the two should be 
linked in some way by the company. Ideally, these events should be related back to the 
original risk statements and the risk statements revised as appropriate. These events would 
provide evidence of whether the original risk factors or statements were realistic or whether 
they needed revising in the light of events. 
5.5 Discussion  
The disclosure of risk factors tends to be quite general and routine and is typical of the type 
of disclosure predicted by both theories. Proprietary cost theory helps us comprehend how 
initial disclosures are inadequate and institutional theory helps us understand the evolution of 
disclosure over time (Cormier et al., 2005). For the most part, prior disclosures are often 
seen as tried and tested and thus can be safely disclosed without raising questions from 
shareholder and stakeholder groups. As discussed earlier (see Section 5.2), if some sort of 
explanation is provided as to why they are still relevant then the information is likely to be 
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useful. In contrast, if the disclosure does not alter from year to year then it is unlikely to be 
helpful and effectively becomes boiler-plate.  In some cases, it is difficult for readers to link 
risk items together. The onus is on readers to ‘join the dots’ and make sense of the picture, 
almost effectively having to design their own risk reports. For instance, in the case of 
Unilever readers are informed that ‘brands’ may be a risk factor but are given no information 
as to which brands might be at risk. In the 2002 annual report all appears well with 
SlimFast
®
. However, following the growth of the fashionable ‘low-carb’ diet, SlimFast® 
sales declined the following year. Readers may not have anticipated this but could, in the 
future, examine the brands and discern which might be at risk, subject to market trends. In 
essence, this means constructing their own risk register. The fact that Unilever has decided to 
focus on a ‘small number of global brands’ alerts readers that Unilever may be exposed if 
one or more of these brands suddenly declines, but they are effectively required to reach this 
conclusion by themselves.  
 
A similar situation appears to have occurred with Tate and Lyle’s product SPLENDA®. 
Readers may be unaware of the exposure for that particular product and consequently may 
have been surprised that the share price fell by significant amounts in 2007 (15.7% and 
27.5%), something not predicted in 2006. Again, in the subsequent annual report, a change 
in market conditions is cited for the decline in demand (such as the growth of the ‘Atkins’ 
diet). These events do not seem to cause any change in the risk factors for the following 
year.  
 
Company managers do not appear to signal good risk management systems via 
comprehensive disclosures and appear to prefer general, routine information which is non–
specific and could apply to any company within the same industry. This is consistent with 
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institutional theory (Dillard et al., 2004; Oliver, 1991) and is also in line with proprietary 
costs theory, as managers arrange matters and disclosures to suit themselves and do not wish 
to disclose valuable/sensitive information, which might be exploited by others including 
industry competitors. Managers may prefer to disclose sensitive information to large 
shareholders or potential investors through other, more private, reporting mechanisms such 
as special meetings (Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2011). Alternatively, they may 
view risk information as something which is useful for internal management only. This may 
signify that managers prefer to provide information which is symbolic, provides a ‘tick in the 
box’ in relation to risk reporting which is not useful or substantive. The implication for 
readers is that they must read between the lines to identify the risks for themselves if they are 
to avoid surprises. The information is provided in annual reports but not in an accessible or 
straightforward manner and users should consider creating their own risk registers. 
 
If agents can obtain the information from private meetings this lack of disclosure is 
understandable but it may be seen as unfair on other shareholders and indeed other 
stakeholders. Such private exchange may also be seen as no longer justifiable with modern 
communication methods. The UK Corporate Governance Code Section E (FRC, 2010) 
suggests that meetings with institutional shareholders should take place with the Board and it 
is perhaps conceivable that risk issues could be added to other discussions related to 
governance or strategy. However, although the Code articulates that this should not override 
the requirements of law to treat shareholders equally, it may be problematic to enforce. It 
seems unlikely that any request to discuss risks and risk appetite would ever be denied. 
Proprietary costs theory may also explain the lack of disclosure. If shareholders can obtain 
the information elsewhere (perhaps via a private meeting see Holland, 1998) it will be in 
their interests for external disclosure to be minimal or of a general nature. Institutional 
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theory may explain why companies seem to disclose in a similar fashion and also highlights 
that these disclosures appear to be decoupled from reality (Oliver, 1991). Thus, risk 
disclosures are unlikely to reflect company internal documents such as a risk register. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
There is agreement among the academic community that current risk disclosures in annual 
reports are general and therefore of little use to investors looking to match their own risk 
appetites (Solomon et al., 2000; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; ASB, 2009). Our findings show that disclosures tend to be general, they change 
little and they seem to bear limited or no relation to the actual risks faced by companies. The 
current disclosures can be seen as “symbolic window dressing” (Carruthers, 1995, p .315) 
which exist “without the organization’s following through” (Irvine, 2008, p. 128) and are 
decoupled from the real risks organizations face (Oliver, 1991; Cormier et al., 2005). 
Symbolic disclosures are unlikely to be useful to readers of financial statements who may be 
attempting to balance their investments with their own risk appetite. Despite this there 
appears to be increasing demand for improved risk reporting (ICAEW, 2011). As companies 
need sophisticated information to manage their own risk portfolios, this strongly suggests 
that useful risk information is being withheld by companies.  The precise reasons for this and 
the extent of non–disclosure are not totally clear (Marshall & Weetman, 2002, 2007). While, 
managers should want to disclose information in order to signal good risk management 
practices thereby reducing the cost of capital, in practice it appears that proprietary costs (or 
their perception) may cause disclosure to be restricted. Managers may choose to disclose 
information privately to fill this disclosure gap, but invariably for others it creates 
information void.  
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We contribute to the literature by using theory to understand current practice and by 
developing a model which can be used to evaluate the quality of risk disclosure over time. 
The model is based around three questions which help to assess disclosure and indicate how 
disclosure can be improved in the future. The model is also particularly useful to preparers 
who can use it to influence the design of their own disclosures.  
 
Hitherto studies in this area have been somewhat inconsistent in their use of theory with 
some papers ignoring theory altogether. The authors maintain that proprietary costs theory 
and institutional theory are particularly useful in understanding the issues involved. The 
initial problem of risk disclosure can be understood by the issues posed by proprietary costs 
theory and the continuing paucity of risk disclosure is also explained by institutional theory. 
It is possible that the solution may also lie with institutional theory.  If bellwether companies 
can be encouraged to improve the design and content of their disclosures, it is possible that 
others will follow their lead. The question is how to start the improvement process. There 
may exist a ‘tipping point’ at which certain companies become prepared to improve their 
disclosures and are willing to withstand some level of proprietary costs. Once this process 
has begun others may feel obliged to mimic their behaviour.    
 
In considering how the relevance of risk factor statements can be improved, parallels can be 
drawn with international financial reporting standard IFRS 8 (Operating Segments). To 
comply with IFRS 8, companies have to report the same information used internally for 
decision making in their annual reports. Empirical research that examines the impact of the 
equivalent US statement of financial accounting standard SFAS 131 (Disclosures about 
Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information) shows that, in general, this management 
approach leads to improved disclosure (Street, Nichols, & Gray, 2000; Ettredge, Kwon, 
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Smith, & Stone, 2006). Consideration of the three questions outlined above, alongside the 
information required for internal management purposes, forms a creditable basis for 
discussion on appropriate risk disclosures. 
  
There is recent evidence of interest from the investment community and the auditing 
profession on the possibility of auditors providing assurance on the management 
commentary within annual reports (Fraser & Pierpoint, 2011; Fraser, Pierpoint, Collins & 
Henry, 2010). Risk factor reporting, in particular, is seen by auditors as an area where there 
is scope to offer assurance that goes further than their limited current involvement. Fraser et 
al. (2011, p. 11) notes that, “proposals for a new form of corporate reporting may be 
juxtaposed with a new audit reporting model”. Similarly, ICAEW’s Chief Executive, writing 
in the Institute’s journal ‘Economia’, also discusses how auditing can be “repurposed” for 
the 21
st
 century by adopting a new auditing approach which better meets society’s needs 
(Izza, 2012, p. 26). Our series of questions provides a basis for improved risk reporting that 
can be used as a guide by auditors in providing assurance on risk factor disclosures. Auditors 
could confirm that the managers have (at the very least) addressed the three questions and 
provided related disclosures. 
  
In addition, companies which fail to supply the information could be asked to provide an 
explanation following the approach taken in the UK’s Corporate Governance Code. That 
approach would depend on investors being prepared to ask questions if they are unsatisfied 
with either the disclosures or the explanation given by the directors. The success or 
otherwise of this approach could be monitored, inter alia, by a financial reporting regulator 
such as the FRC in the UK. At this juncture, this is (arguably) a reasonable way to proceed 
and should help increase attention on the quality of risk disclosures rather than the quantity. 
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Increasing the quantity of general risk disclosures is unlikely to provide investors with the 
information they require. This discussion also has implications for companies in emerging 
markets where the IASB’s Management Commentary (2010) is expected to have a greater 
impact. Our findings show that general guidelines on reporting risk information are unlikely 
to improve the quality of risk information disclosed. 
 
This research suggests that managers should consider three questions in relation to risk 
disclosures. These are not necessarily the only questions that need to be answered but if 
disclosures address these questions, the quality of reporting will be improved. It is suggested 
that the investment, professional and academic communities review these questions to 
determine whether the essence of risk reporting is captured therein. If managers address 
these questions the issues raised by the theoretical and practical problems will be answered 
without compromising the flexibility that companies should have in creating appropriate and 
bespoke disclosures. For instance, by addressing Question 1 and ensuring reported risks 
change over time, managers will avoid the trap of providing standardised routine disclosures. 
By discussing their risk experience (ICAEW, 2011) in Question 3 they will ensure that the 
disclosures are authentic and relevant. A ‘comply or explain’ approach could be adopted, but 
as with the UK’s Corporate Governance Code, the success or otherwise of that would 
depend on active engagement by investors or an appropriate enforcement system. 
 
The companies examined in this study may not necessarily be representative of all listed 
companies but the study provides a useful contribution in the depth of analysis provided. 
Further work involving preparers and users of annual reports will be required to examine the 
viability of the approaches suggested in this paper. In particular, fieldwork in the form of 
detailed case studies could help identify better quality disclosures which answer some of the 
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issues raised in this paper.
 
Research carried out in other countries may also be useful 
especially where good practice can be identified.  Different stakeholders need to consider the 
part they can play in improving disclosures. For preparers a focus on tailored information 
which answers the three questions identified in this paper is helpful. It is important not to be 
over-prescriptive, but the three questions provide a useful initial framework. Shareholders 
need to challenge the inclusion of boiler-plate or routine repeated information in annual 
reports and regulators need to be willing to support investors in questioning mediocre 
disclosures. Auditors need to consider the part they play too and resist safe but boiler plate 
disclosures. All groups need to consider the characteristics of good disclosures and how best 
these can be encouraged.
11 
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Figure 1:  A model to assess the quality of risk reporting based on three research questions  
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Table 1: Linking themes to theoretical lenses 
 
Theoretical lens Themes Link between theory, theme and prior literature 
Proprietary costs 
theory 
(1) Disclosure 
information should be 
both specific to the 
company and regularly 
updated  
 
 
(2) Company managers 
should evaluate risk 
disclosures on a regular 
basis within annual 
reports 
These themes consider whether risk reporting alters over time. Proprietary costs theory 
indicates company managers have concerns about disclosures which fall into the hands of 
competitors. Accordingly they may keep their disclosures bland and uninformative 
(Marshall & Weetman, 2007). Managers may be concerned about the information costs 
(Cormier et al., 2005). This may indicate that risk disclosure is incomplete (Woods & 
Marginson, 2004) and becomes routine. 
 
Managers feel reluctant to change significantly disclosures made in prior years for fear of 
drawing attention to difficult issues faced by the company. Institutional pressures also 
predict routine disclosures (Cormier et al., 2005). While risks may change from year to year 
(either topic wise or in intensity), managers may not alter or evaluate disclosures as they are 
unrelated to actual events. Thus, theory and recent literature suggest that risk factor 
disclosure may exhibit inertia.     
Institutional theory 
 
(3) Disclosures within 
annual reports should 
incorporate the 
discussion of actual risk 
experiences 
Risk research has indicated that risk disclosures tend to be concerned with risk policies 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or be backward looking (Dobler et al., 2011). Thus, previous 
research would suggest that the occurrence of significant events have not been ‘predicted’ 
in prior risk statements or discussed in subsequent risk factor statements.  
 
Institutional theory suggests that companies are unlikely to disclose information where 
others fail to do so. Disclosures are likely to be decoupled from actual risk events that occur 
and are likely to include policy statements of a routine nature. 
Note: Although proprietary costs theory and institutional theory are shown separately in this table, they often work together in militating 
against good disclosure. Both proprietary costs and institutional factors encourage the continuation of routine disclosures which fail to take 
account of actual events. 
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Table 2: Examples of general and specific disclosures  
 
Disclosure 
Type 
Disclosure Source 
General 
Disclosure 
The Group’s operations are also subject to the 
risks and uncertainties inherent in doing 
business in numerous countries. 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Report and Accounts 
and Form 20-F 2003, 
p. 12. 
 
Specific 
Industry 
Disclosure 
Despite safety measures adopted by the Group, 
our products could become contaminated. We 
use many ingredients in manufacturing 
beverages and confectionery, which increases 
the risk of contamination, either accidental or 
malicious. While we believe that incidents of 
this type are generally localised, any 
contamination may be expensive to remedy, and 
could cause delays in manufacturing and adverse 
effects on our reputation and financial condition. 
 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Report and Accounts 
and Form 20-F 2003, 
p. 173. 
 
Specific 
Company 
Disclosure 
The sensitivity analysis below shows forward-
looking projections of market risk assuming 
certain adverse market conditions occur. This is 
a method of analysis used to assess and mitigate 
risk and should not be considered a projection of 
likely future events and losses. 
 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Report and Accounts 
and Form 20-F 2003, 
p. 42. 
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Table 3.1: Sources of significant news 
 Frequency 
 
Negative 
news 
Positive 
news 
Interim announcement (half yearly and quarterly) 8 3 
Final announcement 1 0 
Trading update 3 1 
External news source (media)                 2 6 
Analyst 0 1 
Total 14 11 
 
Table 3.2: News events 
 
Negative Events Frequency 
Key product sales lower than expected   6 
Competitor actions   3 
Regulatory action   3 
Information for decision making:    
                                Integration 2  
                                Budgeting and planning  1  
                                Taxation 1  
                                Environmental scan 2  
Subtotal  6 
Commodity price increases   4 
Exchange rates   2 
Brand name erosion   1 
Operations (distribution)   1 
Sovereign/Political   1 
Macro-economic   1 
Total   28 
    
Positive Events    
Key product sales higher than expected   3 
Increase in emerging market sales   2 
Leadership   2 
Regulatory   2 
Strategic investment   2 
Information for decision making:    
Environmental scan 1  
Subtotal   1 
Financial markets (low valuations)   1 
Expectation of an increase in sales   1 
Total   14 
 
Note: The total negative news events (28) is more than the total of identified negative news 
events (14) because in a number of cases more than one news event is associated with a 
particular significant price change (for example earnings may have fallen because of a key 
product not performing as expected but also due to a rise in raw material prices). The same 
applies to positive news events. 
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Table 4: Number of general and specific principal risk factors  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Cadbury 
PLC 
 
 
8 (3) 
 
 
11 (2) 9 (2) 9 (1)  15 (0) 14 (3) 
 
 
11 (2.0) 
Tate and 
Lyle PLC 
 
 
* 
 
 
* 
 
 
* 16 (3) 11 (1) 13 (0) 
 
 
13 (1.0) 
Associated 
British 
Foods PLC 
 
 
** 
 
 
** ** ** 5 (2) 7 (1)  
 
 
6 (2) 
Unilever 
PLC 
 
 
10 (5) 
 
 
8 (4) 6 (4) 7 (2)  8 (1) 8 (1) 
 
 
8 (3.0)  
 
The figures in brackets indicate the number of risk factors in each year that are specific in 
nature. 
*Tate and Lyle did not have an explicit risk factor statement until 2005 
**ABF did not have an explicit risk factor statement until 2006 
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Table 5.1 Percentage of risk factors where the substance of the discussion remains the 
same over time  
 
 2002-2003 
Cadbury PLC 
(2002-2007) 
71 % 
Tate and Lyle PLC (2005-2007) 100 % 
Associated British Foods PLC (2006-2007) 57 % 
Unilever PLC (2002-2007) 60 % 
 
The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of common risk factors where there was 
no change to the substance of the discussion by the total number of common risk factors for 
each company. 
 
Table 5.2 Risk factor resemblance score 
 
 2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
Average 
Cadbury PLC  
0.8 0.5 0.42 0.5 0.15 
 
0.47 
Tate and Lyle PLC    0.83 0.73 0.78 
Associated British Foods PLC  
   0.24 
 
0.24 
Unilever PLC 0.37 0.74 0.23 0.83 0.72 0.58 
 
The resemblance scores are obtained using the Ferret copy detector. The Ferret copy detector 
software computes a similarity measure based on trigrams (a group of three letters 
representing one sound) found within the documents under comparison. This measure is a 
number from zero (no copying) to one (everything copied). The scores in the table represent 
risk factor similarity measures for each company across two consecutive years. For example, 
in the case of Cadbury PLC, 0.8 is the similarity score based on comparing common risk 
factors in 2002 and 2003 and 0.47 represents the average score across the time period 
examined. 
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 Notes 
 
1
We do not necessarily argue that boilerplate disclosure is useless and there may be some 
circumstances where it can serve a purpose (see Spira & Page, 2010 who argue that in the 
case of internal control boilerplate disclosures the fact of disclosure may be more important 
than the content). However, in the case of risk disclosures the authors believe that the 
fluidity of risk situations is such that disclosures require regular reflection. 
 
2
 Research on risk disclosure often refers to different theories. Our research indicates that in 
excess of ten theories have been used in prior risk disclosure literature (including agency, 
attribution, contingency, impression management, information costs, information relevance, 
institutional, legitimacy, modern portfolio, proprietary costs and signalling). Some studies 
make reference to a large number of theories (for example, Linsley, Shrives, & Crumpton, 
2006; Marshall & Weetman, 2007; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007) but it is not always clear how 
the specific theories identified relate to the variables discussed. Surprisingly, a large 
proportion of studies make no explicit reference to theory at all (Collins, Davie, & Weetman, 
1993; Dunne et al., 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). 
 
3
 During the drafting of our questions we consulted four stakeholder groups with an interest 
in financial reporting practices, who attested to the suitability of the questions. These include 
three investment analysts, two independent directors of listed companies, two academics (in 
addition to the authors) and a UK professional accountancy body. 
 
4
 Northcote Internet Ltd is a free online research tool that provides financial information on 
UK listed companies. Information is available by sector and by index 
(www.northcote.co.uk).  
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5
 Cadbury PLC was acquired by Kraft Foods in February 2010. 
 
6 
We are most grateful to one of the referees for suggesting the use of this software. 
Although one of the authors has previously made use of ‘Turnitin’ software (see 
Turnitin.com or submit.ac.uk) in their research, Ferret software was particularly suited to the 
current task because it enabled straightforward comparison of a specific risk disclosure and 
subsequent years’ disclosure, without for example, unnecessary comparison with other 
internet sites. 
 
7
 We obtain similar results if we use two standard deviations.  
 
8
 In the majority of cases, the news was reported on the day after the event. 
 
9
The analysts that we spoke to readily identified a number of these significant events. 
 
10
See Reeve and Philpot (1998) for a discussion of the application of SPC in financial 
management process improvement.  The use of standard deviations to identify extreme 
observations such as price changes is common in the financial economics literature. See 
Melvin and Taylor (2009) for a paper that uses this concept to identify significant currency 
exchange rate changes following the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
11 
The authors are most grateful for various useful suggestions made by the two anonymous 
reviewers, the editors and the associate editor. We should also like to thank Professor Niamh 
Brennan of University College Dublin for her helpful insightful comments, Brian Singleton-
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Green of the ICAEW and finally, Phil Darby for the ideas behind the risk model. The authors 
also acknowledge seedcorn financial support from the Scottish Accountancy Trust for 
Education and Research (SATER) provided to one of the authors during the initial stages of 
data gathering. 
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